Zephyr PTP: Denial of service via unvalidated Delay_Resp interval
Summary
The IEEE 1588 (PTP) implementation of Zephyr adopts the logMessageInterval value of a received Delay_Resp message without validation. A crafted value can stall the PTP thread or cause a continuous flood of multicast Delay_Req messages. An attacker on the same network segment needs only the victim's port identity and a pending sequence ID, which the victim broadcasts, and can succeed with a single crafted message. The impact is limited to availability of the PTP subsystem and the local network segment.
Affected
- Zephyr 3.7.0 up to before 4.3.2
- Zephyr 4.4.0 up to before 4.5.0
- Other versions are listed as unaffected by default.
Fixed in
- Upgrade to Zephyr 4.3.2 or 4.5.0 or later.
- Upstream fix commits: f6b9459f082a (Delay_Resp validation) and 334bf57f416f (Sync validation).
Workaround
- Unknown. No vendor-documented workaround identified.
- Disable CONFIG_PTP on devices where PTP is not required.
Exploitation
- No public proof-of-concept known.
- No evidence of active exploitation; not listed in CISA KEV according to a third-party tracker.
Our recommendation
- Identify devices running Zephyr with PTP enabled, such as embedded, IoT, lab or industrial equipment.
- Ask device vendors whether their firmware contains a fixed Zephyr version and install it in the normal firmware cycle.
- Disable PTP where it is not needed and place PTP traffic on a segregated VLAN.
- Monitor for abnormal multicast Delay_Req traffic or time-synchronization stalls.
Public exploits
PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit and Exploit-DB list nothing for this CVE.
Research sources
- CVE Record CVE-2026-87042 www.cve.org
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-cx9q-8hq3-7hpr github.com
- Commit f6b9459f082a: validate delay request interval of a Delay_Resp github.com
- Commit 334bf57f416f: validate the sync interval of a Sync message github.com
- Zephyr 4.3.2 release notes github.com
- Zephyr issue #119091 github.com
- Zephyr vulnerability documentation docs.zephyrproject.org
Researched and written up in English and German by an AI (Claude by Anthropic) based on NVD, CISA, EPSS and the sources listed. The vendor information is authoritative. Researched on 11 Nov 2026, 11:54.
Original description (NVD)
The IEEE 1588 (PTP) port implementation in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c adopted the logMessageInterval field of a received Delay_Resp message without any validation. port_delay_resp_msg_process() stored the raw wire value (a full-range int8_t) into port_ds.log_min_delay_req_interval, and that value is later used as a shift count by port_timer_set_timeout() when the Delay_Req timer is armed. Values below about -30 truncate the computed timeout to zero, and values with a magnitude of 64 or more perform an undefined shift of a uint64_t; the standards-defined "not applicable" encoding 0x7F fell into the latter case as well. PTP messages are received over unauthenticated link-local traffic (UDP multicast on 224.0.1.129, IPv6 multicast, or raw IEEE 802.3), and the handler accepts a Delay_Resp from any sender as long as the port is a time receiver using the end-to-end delay mechanism and the message echoes the port identity and a pending sequence id — both of which the victim itself broadcasts in its Delay_Req. Any node on the same link can therefore inject a single crafted Delay_Resp, or simply become the time transmitter and advertise the bogus interval. Once the delay timer is armed with a zero timeout, the cooperative PTP thread re-arms and retransmits a Delay_Req on every tick. Each transmission takes a buffer from the fixed CONFIG_PTP_MSG_POLL_SIZE message slab (default 10) and holds it on port->delay_req_list for three seconds, so the slab is emptied within milliseconds and ptp_msg_alloc() then blocks with K_FOREVER inside the only thread that frees those buffers — permanently stalling time synchronization until reboot. Where a transmit-timestamp callback on another thread keeps recycling buffers, the result is instead a sustained multicast Delay_Req flood and continuous CPU consumption. There is no memory corruption and no disclosure of data; the impact is availability of the PTP subsystem and of the local network segment. The fix rejects intervals outside a representable range and treats 0x7F as "not applicable" as required by IEEE 1588-2019 Table 42. The equivalent unchecked adoption of logMessageInterval from Sync messages in port_sync_msg_process(), a weaker variant of the same issue, is fixed by the companion change 334bf57f416f (#118150), which applies the same range check, ignores the field for unicast Sync messages and treats 0x7F as not applicable.
Sources
The tracker combines official, freely usable data sources – updated continuously:
- NVD (NIST) – CVEs, rating (CVSS), affected products
- CISA KEV – vulnerabilities confirmed by CISA as actively exploited
- CISA Vulnrichment – CISA assessment (SSVC) in the official CVE record
- FIRST EPSS – probability of exploitation
- Microsoft MSRC – Patch Tuesday: vulnerabilities, severity, updates
- PoC-in-GitHub – public proof-of-concept repositories
- Metasploit (Rapid7) – modules of the Metasploit Framework
- Exploit-DB (OffSec) – archive of public exploits (links only)
- Patch days: official vendor pages (linked per vendor) (Vendor patch days)
This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS data © FIRST.org.
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