Linux kernel: Race condition in mount detach allows access to hidden files
Summary
In the Linux kernel, unlink(), rmdir() and rename() detach mounts from a dentry while it is still hashed and findable. A local user with low privileges who races a lookup against this window can reach a file that a mount had covered, which can expose its content. The attack requires local access and precise timing, and no exploitation in the wild is known.
Affected
- Linux kernel from commit 8ed936b5671bfb33d89bc60bdcc7cf0470ba52fe (since 3.18) until the fixed stable versions listed below
- Branches not listed below: status unknown
Fixed in
- 5.10.273
- 5.15.224
- 6.1.191
- 6.6.160
- 6.12.114
- 6.18.57
- 7.2.11
Workaround
Unknown. No vendor workaround is documented.
Exploitation
No known exploitation in the wild. The reporter measured the race in a lab setup, reading an overmounted file in 11938 of 16140 unlinks.
Our recommendation
- Install the kernel update from your Linux distribution as soon as it is available, and prioritise multi-user hosts, container hosts and CI runners.
- Check your distribution's security tracker, since fixed package versions are not yet confirmed for all distributions.
- Monitor for unexpected local access by untrusted users on shared systems.
Public exploits
PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit and Exploit-DB list nothing for this CVE.
Research sources
- NVD record via Vulners vulners.com
- Ubuntu security page ubuntu.com
- OSV Bell Systems advisory osv.dev
- Stable commit 8300de4a git.kernel.org
- Stable commit 528b383d git.kernel.org
- Stable commit db90eecb git.kernel.org
Researched and written up in English and German by an AI (Claude by Anthropic) based on NVD, CISA, EPSS and the sources listed. The vendor information is authoritative. Researched on 31 Oct 2026, 10:45.
Original description (NVD)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namespace: unhash a dentry before detaching the mounts on it unlink(), rmdir() and rename() remove the entry from the filesystem, call detach_mounts() on the entry with the inode locked and then call d_delete() once the inode is unlocked. The thing is that between detach_mounts() and d_delete() the dentry is still hashed and positive. But after detach_mounts() nothing covers the dentry anymore. A lookup that finds this dentry in the dcache can uncover what the mounts hid. That's a problem when unlinking files or directories that are mountpoints in other mount namespaces. Everybody who had the underlying entry covered can race the detach_mount() call until d_delete() has run. The race window isn't all that small. It encompasses namespace_unlock() with a full synchronize_rcu_expedited() grace period and the inode_unlock() of the entry. In my experiments three walkers that kept trying read an overmounted file in 11938 of the 16140 unlinks that removed its mountpoint from a bind mount of the filesystem within a minute. Fun fact, d_invalidate() has the same ordering problem but gets it right. It unhashes the dentry first and detaches the mounts afterwards. Let's do the same in __detach_mounts(): - A lookup that hasn't found the dentry yet misses it in the dcache and waits for the directory lock that the caller holds until the name is gone for good. - A lockless lookup that found it already fails the mount_lock check while the dentry still counts as a mountpoint and the d_seq check once it doesn't, and retries. This fixes the lockless path. We still need to fix the reference count lookup in a follow-up patch. So d_drop() the dentry. The dentry stays positive and held but can't be found anymore. Then proceed with the detach and unlink. Reproducer: The reads were counted with the program below, three walkers for 60 s in a VM with 4 CPUs. The race window is stretched with the debug patch pasted here. fs.detach_race_walk_us sleeps in lookup_fast() once it found a mountpoint dentry and before its mounts are crossed. fs.detach_race_unlink_us sleeps in vfs_unlink() between detach_mounts() and d_delete(). // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of * its mount, against lookups that open it through that copy. * * A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file * MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound * on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is * closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1, * where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT. * A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was * gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED). * * usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers] */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdatomic.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/openat2.h> #ifndef __NR_open_tree #define __NR_open_tree 428 #endif #ifndef __NR_move_mount #define __NR_move_mount 429 #endif #ifndef __NR_openat2 #define __NR_openat2 437 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC #define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC #endif #ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004 #endif #define WORK "/tmp/uc" #define ADIR WORK "/A" static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3; static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting; static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER; static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 wh ---truncated---
NVD references (8)
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/528b383dc35d1e5caf64ddf5d35f983ae543b0d0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8300de4aa5d09061bfcf2af5b52c0cdba3873185
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d71bfc9b3fc15d7103e82ea9dc5057541866e46
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97cc290c57ea04337fd33912d780367add41525c
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3fa3811ffffa130586c4ff8f7299b7fc69216d5
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bb917ec497f6099c6cb9375596e085a5f6b52ff2
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d29cd99db3db74cf3447be74d25740981789d461
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db90eecbde319527aa9480c039d32a0f5fe80574
Sources
The tracker combines official, freely usable data sources – updated continuously:
- NVD (NIST) – CVEs, rating (CVSS), affected products
- CISA KEV – vulnerabilities confirmed by CISA as actively exploited
- CISA Vulnrichment – CISA assessment (SSVC) in the official CVE record
- FIRST EPSS – probability of exploitation
- Microsoft MSRC – Patch Tuesday: vulnerabilities, severity, updates
- PoC-in-GitHub – public proof-of-concept repositories
- Metasploit (Rapid7) – modules of the Metasploit Framework
- Exploit-DB (OffSec) – archive of public exploits (links only)
- Patch days: official vendor pages (linked per vendor) (Vendor patch days)
This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS data © FIRST.org.
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