Linux kernel: Information disclosure via unlink race on locked mountpoint
Summary
A flaw in the Linux kernel path lookup (namei) in refwalk mode can let a local user read the content of a file that is a locked mountpoint after it has been unlinked. The lookup can reach the underlying entry if it runs during a narrow window while the unlink is in progress. Exploitation requires a local account with low privileges and a race condition.
Affected
- Linux kernel stable branches from commit 8ed936b5671bfb33d89bc60bdcc7cf0470ba52fe onwards (introduced in 3.18 per OSV and CNA data)
- Exact affected ranges per distribution are unverified; the CVE record and OSV data differ.
- Unknown for Debian, Ubuntu, RHEL and SUSE package versions.
Fixed in
- Upstream stable fixes: commits 5f97df8ca7fadf5b53954f50073445ba193902c0, 8189ab688f5a2c745dc90b63374da02f213d6994, b43ff2deef48260bfbdc0dcb520f7929bd3e4007, e2b10181d913b4efa3a8dc67a532f859aa5f95e0
- Per OSV: fixed in 6.12.113, 6.18.57 and 7.2.11.
- Distribution-specific fixed package versions: Unknown.
Workaround
Unknown.
Exploitation
- No evidence of exploitation in the wild found; not listed in CISA KEV.
- Public proof of concept: Unknown.
- EPSS listed as 0.00175 on Vulners.
Our recommendation
- Install the kernel update from your Linux distribution or vendor as soon as it is available and reboot.
- Check which systems run affected kernel versions, especially multi-user systems and hosts with untrusted local accounts.
- Limit local shell access and monitor for unusual file access patterns until patched.
- Note that severity ratings differ (NVD CVSS 8.8, Red Hat 4.7, Ubuntu Medium); prioritise according to your own exposure.
Public exploits
PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit and Exploit-DB list nothing for this CVE.
Research sources
- Stable kernel commit 8189ab688f5a2c745dc90b63374da02f213d6994 git.kernel.org
- Stable kernel commit 5f97df8ca7fadf5b53954f50073445ba193902c0 git.kernel.org
- Stable kernel commit b43ff2deef48260bfbdc0dcb520f7929bd3e4007 git.kernel.org
- Stable kernel commit e2b10181d913b4efa3a8dc67a532f859aa5f95e0 git.kernel.org
- Ubuntu security notice CVE-2026-98980 ubuntu.com
- Vulners NVD record CVE-2026-98980 vulners.com
- OSV record CVE-2026-98980 (Alpaquita) osv.dev
- Red Hat Security Data API CVE-2026-98980 access.redhat.com
Researched and written up in English and German by an AI (Claude by Anthropic) based on NVD, CISA, EPSS and the sources listed. The vendor information is authoritative. Researched on 31 Oct 2026, 10:45.
Original description (NVD)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: namei: don't reveal overmounted entries in refwalk In rcuwalk the dentry is validated before it is accepted. step_into() step_into() rechecks d_seq and __follow_mount_rcu() rechecks mount_lock. An entry that gets unlinked in between causes the lookup to retry and miss. A refwalk doesn't do this. lookup_fast() takes a reference on the hashed dentry and simply accepts it. So an unlink that happens after the reference was taken isn't seen by refwalk. That's fine for a simple file. We just happened to open it before it was unlinked, no problem. For a mountpoint and specifically a locked mountpoint it very much isn't. The unlink detaches all mounts and then removes the name. Any refwalk that hasn't traversed the mounts yet simply reveals the underlying entry. It's a very narrow window but it can be hit: reads of a covered file in 60 s, 3 walkers, ~15000 unlinks no widening 27 that step + 200 us 3741 See the appended patch for a more reliable reproducer. So check the entry after step_into(). unlink(), rmdir() and rename() mark the dentry with dont_mount() before they detach the mounts and remove the dentry. So a dentry that is marked with DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT and is unhashed by the time its mounts were looked at is a name that was unlinked under the refwalk. DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT is read after the mounts were looked up and it is set before they are detached by detach_mounts(). A refwalk that missed the mounts will see DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT. Plain d_unlinked() is fine. A rename takes the dentry off its hash chain but ___d_drop() leaves d_hash.pprev set. So only __d_drop() and a rename over the dentry unhash it. The only move that flips IS_ROOT splices in a disconnected alias. That doesn't have DCACHE_CANT_MOUNT set. Add the to step_into_slowpath(). ".." and LOOKUP_DOWN may legitimately land on an unhashed directory. A refwalk that crossed onto a mount has path.mnt different from nd->path.mnt. A dentry that a filesystem dropped on its own (d_invalidate(), d_drop()) doesn't have the flag set and is treated as before. // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of * its mount, against walkers that open it through that copy. * * A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file * MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound * on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is * closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1, * where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT. * A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was * gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED). * * usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers] */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE #define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include <errno.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdatomic.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/mount.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <linux/openat2.h> #ifndef __NR_open_tree #define __NR_open_tree 428 #endif #ifndef __NR_move_mount #define __NR_move_mount 429 #endif #ifndef __NR_openat2 #define __NR_openat2 437 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE #define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1 #endif #ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC #define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC #endif #ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH #define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004 #endif #define WORK "/tmp/uc" #define ADIR WORK "/A" static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3; static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting; static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER; static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 while there is none */ static atomic_long n_unlink, n_walk, n_mark, n_enoent, n_othe ---truncated---
NVD references (4)
Sources
The tracker combines official, freely usable data sources – updated continuously:
- NVD (NIST) – CVEs, rating (CVSS), affected products
- CISA KEV – vulnerabilities confirmed by CISA as actively exploited
- CISA Vulnrichment – CISA assessment (SSVC) in the official CVE record
- FIRST EPSS – probability of exploitation
- Microsoft MSRC – Patch Tuesday: vulnerabilities, severity, updates
- PoC-in-GitHub – public proof-of-concept repositories
- Metasploit (Rapid7) – modules of the Metasploit Framework
- Exploit-DB (OffSec) – archive of public exploits (links only)
- Patch days: official vendor pages (linked per vendor) (Vendor patch days)
This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS data © FIRST.org.
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