Cisco NX-OS: Remote code execution in VXLAN OAM (NGOAM)
Summary
A flaw in the NGOAM (Next Generation Operation, Administration and Maintenance) feature of Cisco NX-OS on Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series switches allows improper input validation of IP traffic. An unauthenticated remote attacker who sends crafted packets to an IP interface of an affected switch can execute arbitrary code with root privileges or crash processes, causing a reload and denial of service. Exposure requires NGOAM enabled together with SRv6 or NV Overlay, and only standalone NX-OS mode is affected.
Affected
- Cisco Nexus 3000 and 9000 Series switches in standalone NX-OS mode
- Only if NGOAM is enabled and either SRv6 or NV Overlay is enabled (NV Overlay also requires a VXLAN EVPN VNI mapped to an NVE interface with at least one learned peer VTEP)
- Affected releases listed in the advisory include 9.3(3) to 10.3(1); verify the full list in the Cisco Software Checker
- Not affected: Nexus 7000, Nexus 9000 in ACI mode, and other Cisco products listed in the advisory
Fixed in
Unknown. Cisco has released software updates; determine the fixed release for your train with the Cisco Software Checker.
Workaround
- Disable NGOAM if it is not needed (no feature ngoam in global configuration mode); Cisco lists this as the mitigation
- Cisco has offered Live Protect shields as temporary mitigation
- Restrict inbound IP traffic to switch interfaces with ACLs (third-party guidance)
- Note: the advisory header states no workarounds are available; the measures above are temporary
Exploitation
- Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use
- CISA SSVC: exploitation none, automatable yes, technical impact total
- No public proof-of-concept found in the sources reviewed; not listed in KEV according to one source
Our recommendation
- Check whether NGOAM is enabled (show feature | include ngoam) and whether SRv6 or NV Overlay is in use
- If NGOAM is not required, disable it and restrict access to switch IP interfaces
- Identify fixed releases with the Cisco Software Checker and patch affected switches
- Monitor for unusual traffic to switch interfaces and reloads
Public exploits
PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit and Exploit-DB list nothing for this CVE.
Research sources
- Cisco Security Advisory cisco-sa-ngoam-rce-LWKQ4BU sec.cloudapps.cisco.com
- OpenCVE CVE-2026-76486 app.opencve.io
- VulDB 415091 vuldb.com
- Strix CVE-2026-76486 www.strix.ai
- TheHackerWire CVE-2026-76486 www.thehackerwire.com
- BleepingComputer: Cisco warns of critical flaws allowing Nexus switch takeover www.bleepingcomputer.com
Researched and written up in English and German by an AI (Claude by Anthropic) based on NVD, CISA, EPSS and the sources listed. The vendor information is authoritative. Researched on 30 Oct 2026, 20:42.
Original description (NVD)
A vulnerability in the VXLAN Operation, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM) feature of Cisco NX-OS Software, known as NGOAM, could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges or cause a Denial-of-Service (DoS) on an affected device. This vulnerability is due to improper input validation of IP traffic when the NGOAM feature is enabled. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted packets to an IP interface on an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code with root privileges and could cause process crashes resulting in a reload and DoS condition.
Sources
The tracker combines official, freely usable data sources – updated continuously:
- NVD (NIST) – CVEs, rating (CVSS), affected products
- CISA KEV – vulnerabilities confirmed by CISA as actively exploited
- CISA Vulnrichment – CISA assessment (SSVC) in the official CVE record
- FIRST EPSS – probability of exploitation
- Microsoft MSRC – Patch Tuesday: vulnerabilities, severity, updates
- PoC-in-GitHub – public proof-of-concept repositories
- Metasploit (Rapid7) – modules of the Metasploit Framework
- Exploit-DB (OffSec) – archive of public exploits (links only)
- Patch days: official vendor pages (linked per vendor) (Vendor patch days)
This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS data © FIRST.org.
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