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Bouncy Castle bc-csharp: Denial of service via unbounded CMP/CRMF PBM iteration count

CVE-2026-63568High 8.7

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Summary

The Bouncy Castle C# library (bc-csharp) before 2.7.0 does not limit the password-based MAC iteration count in CMP and CRMF message verification unless the caller set an explicit maximum via a specific constructor. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a single crafted CMP message or certificate request that forces up to about 2^31 hash iterations, keeping a CPU core busy for minutes. Repeated messages can exhaust a CMP server such as a certificate authority or registration authority.

Affected

  • bc-csharp (NuGet BouncyCastle.Cryptography) versions 0 to before 2.7.0
  • Exposed only where applications verify CMP messages or CRMF certificate requests from untrusted parties, for example ProtectedPkiMessage.Verify or CertificateRequestMessage.IsValidSigningKeyPop with the default constructor

Fixed in

  • BC C# .NET 2.7.0 (default iteration limit of 1,000,000 applied)

Workaround

  • Upgrade to 2.7.0 or later. This is the vendor remedy.
  • If an upgrade is not possible immediately, construct the verifying PKMacBuilder as new PKMacBuilder(new DefaultPKMacPrimitivesProvider(), maxIterations) with a positive maxIterations that covers legitimate peers, or read the iteration count from the message and reject excessive values before calling Verify or IsValidSigningKeyPop.
  • Restrict and rate-limit network access to CMP and certificate-request endpoints.

Exploitation

  • CISA SSVC: exploitation none, automatable yes, technical impact partial.
  • No evidence of in-the-wild exploitation found.
  • No public proof of concept found.

Our recommendation

  • Check whether any .NET application or PKI component uses bc-csharp for CMP or CRMF processing, including transitive NuGet dependencies.
  • Update BouncyCastle.Cryptography to 2.7.0 or later and verify the version against the NuGet package.
  • If upgrading is delayed, apply the explicit-maximum constructor or message pre-checks described in the vendor advisory.
  • Limit exposure of CA, RA or enrolment endpoints to trusted networks and monitor for CPU spikes and repeated CMP requests.
  • Applications that only create PBM-protected messages or accept messages solely from trusted sources are not affected.

Public exploits

PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit and Exploit-DB list nothing for this CVE.

Research sources

Researched and written up in English and German by an AI (Claude by Anthropic) based on NVD, CISA, EPSS and the sources listed. The vendor information is authoritative. Researched on 1 Nov 2026, 06:14.

Original description (NVD)

Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in the CMP/CRMF password-based MAC verifier (PKMacBuilder) in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. bc-csharp before 2.7.0 allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service through CPU exhaustion via a CMP message or CRMF certificate request whose PBMParameter declares a very large iteration count, because PKMacBuilder enforced its iteration-count ceiling only when the caller had supplied an explicit maximum through the PKMacBuilder(IPKMacPrimitivesProvider, int) constructor. With any other constructor, ProtectedPkiMessage.Verify and CertificateRequestMessage.IsValidSigningKeyPop performed as many hash iterations as the sender requested, up to about 2^31, before the MAC could be checked.

NVD references (4)

Sources

The tracker combines official, freely usable data sources – updated continuously:

This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS data © FIRST.org.

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