Privasys ra-tls-clients: Attestation bypass by accepting evidence from any TEE platform
Summary
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients before version 0.11.0 accept TEE attestation evidence without checking that it comes from an explicitly authorized platform. A network attacker who can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised, unrevoked platform can have valid measurements from a different TEE platform accepted as if they came from the intended Attester. This allows the attacker to impersonate the attested TLS endpoint.
Affected
- Privasys ra-tls-clients, all versions before 0.11.0 (vendor advisory lists up to v0.10.0; version range to be confirmed with the vendor)
Fixed in
- Version 0.11.0 (release v0.11.0, fix commit 1179ed0)
Workaround
- Unknown. No documented workaround for versions before 0.11.0.
Exploitation
- CISA SSVC: Exploitation none, Automatable no, Technical Impact total.
- Not listed in CISA KEV.
- No public proof of concept or in-the-wild exploitation known.
- VulDB rates exploitability as easy, which differs from the CISA rating.
Our recommendation
- Check whether any internal or customer-facing system uses ra-tls-clients, for example via a dependency or SBOM scan.
- If it is used, upgrade to version 0.11.0 or later.
- Where the platform allow-list is needed, configure it as described in the vendor documentation.
- If the library is not used, no action beyond normal monitoring.
Public exploits
PoC-in-GitHub, Metasploit and Exploit-DB list nothing for this CVE.
Research sources
- GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-pj2x-5wqv-fh57 github.com
- Release v0.11.0 github.com
- Fix commit 1179ed0 github.com
- OSV entry CVE-2026-108362 osv.dev
- OpenCVE CVE-2026-108362 app.opencve.io
Researched and written up in English and German by an AI (Claude by Anthropic) based on NVD, CISA, EPSS and the sources listed. The vendor information is authoritative. Researched on 31 Oct 2026, 06:53.
Original description (NVD)
Privasys Remote Attestation TLS Clients provides multi-language utilities for verifying attested TLS connections. Prior to 0.11.0, TEE attestation evidence in Privasys attested TLS is accepted without requiring an explicitly authorized platform identity. When a network attacker can forge evidence or extract attestation secrets from a compromised unrevoked platform, the verifier accepts valid measurements from a different unrevoked TEE platform as though they came from the intended Attester. The attacker can impersonate the attested TLS endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.0.
Sources
The tracker combines official, freely usable data sources – updated continuously:
- NVD (NIST) – CVEs, rating (CVSS), affected products
- CISA KEV – vulnerabilities confirmed by CISA as actively exploited
- CISA Vulnrichment – CISA assessment (SSVC) in the official CVE record
- FIRST EPSS – probability of exploitation
- Microsoft MSRC – Patch Tuesday: vulnerabilities, severity, updates
- PoC-in-GitHub – public proof-of-concept repositories
- Metasploit (Rapid7) – modules of the Metasploit Framework
- Exploit-DB (OffSec) – archive of public exploits (links only)
- Patch days: official vendor pages (linked per vendor) (Vendor patch days)
This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD. EPSS data © FIRST.org.
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